Security controls you can verify.

Production infrastructure

The hosted service runs on Google Cloud in the United States. Application instances have no public IP addresses; production traffic reaches them through a Google Cloud HTTPS load balancer with managed certificates and a TLS 1.2 minimum. The Cloud SQL database is private-addressed, requires TLS, and has automated backups, point-in-time recovery, and deletion protection. The public DNS zone is signed with DNSSEC, with a validating chain of trust from the signed .dev parent zone to emisar.dev.

Secrets live in Secret Manager and workload identities receive access only to the secrets and resources they need. Administrative access is restricted through Identity-Aware Proxy and OS Login. VPC flow logs and Cloud Monitoring alerts cover the platform; independent external probes feed on-call alerting and our public status page.

Change control & software delivery

Pull requests run with read-only permissions and no deployment credentials. The main-branch delivery workflow calls the same reusable CI workflow again, so production receives the commit that passed CI. That run covers compilation, tests, dependency-advisory checks, static security analysis, architecture checks, and an image smoke test. GitHub Actions are pinned to exact commits; downloaded tools are version-pinned and checksum-verified.

Delivery scans the tested image for high and critical vulnerabilities, generates a CycloneDX SBOM, and publishes provenance and SBOM attestations. The image is promoted by immutable digest, never rebuilt after testing. Infrastructure changes become a saved HCP Terraform plan: auto-apply is disabled, the plan must still match the current main commit and state, and a person must review it and choose Confirm & Apply. Rollouts keep the previous instances serving until the replacement passes readiness checks.

Subprocessors

A short list, each contractually bound to confidentiality and to processing data only on our instructions:

• Google Cloud Platform: application hosting, networking, managed PostgreSQL, and backups, US region.
• Paddle: payment processing and subscription retention (Paddle Retain, loaded only on the checkout page); we never see or store full card numbers.
• Postmark: transactional email (confirmations, approvals, magic links).
• Mixpanel: marketing & growth analytics; server-side with no analytics identifier cookie, never your runners' data.
• Sentry: error monitoring, hosted in the United States; request bodies, parameters, user email and IP fields are removed before sending, and configured secret keys are redacted.
• X Corp: advertising attribution for signups arriving from an X ad; server-side, and only the ad's click identifier, the signup time, and an opaque one-way hash that lets X discard duplicates.

We update this list before adding a subprocessor. See the privacy policy for the full detail.

Security review & procurement

Security review material is available now. We complete security questionnaires and can provide supporting material for access control, change management, vulnerability management, monitoring, backup and recovery, retention, and deletion. SOC 2 Type II audit preparation is underway; the independent examination is not complete. We also offer a Data Processing Addendum you can sign (email support@emisar.dev to request one).

Insurance

Professional-indemnity coverage of USD $1M and general-liability coverage of USD $2M apply to hosted use on Team and Enterprise plans, worldwide including the USA and Canada. A certificate of insurance is available on request.

Availability & SLA

The hosted control plane targets 99.95% monthly uptime on Team and 99.99% on Enterprise, backed by a written SLA in the Enterprise order form. Because runners dial out and the host has the last word, a control-plane outage pauses new dispatches. It never leaves an action half-run or bypasses a gate.

Deployment & licensing

emisar runs as a hosted control plane today. The code that runs on your hosts (the runner, the MCP bridge, and the action packs) is open source under the Apache License 2.0. You can inspect, build, and keep operating it independently of us. The control plane is source-available under the Business Source License, and each release converts to Apache-2.0 on its change date. So the code can't end up locked behind a vendor that disappears. Supported self-hosted and air-gapped deployments are not generally available. If on-prem or air-gap is a hard requirement, contact us. We want to hear about it.

Release integrity

A public GitHub Actions workflow builds the current runner and MCP-bridge releases. It publishes SLSA Build Level 2 provenance for the combined checksum and each archive, signed by Sigstore and bound to the exact tag and workflow that produced it. Before a binary ever runs as sudo on your host, you can prove that it came from our source, not a tampered mirror, and that its bytes match what we published:

# authenticate the checksum metadata first (use the MCP names for the bridge)
$ gh attestation verify SHA256SUMS --bundle SHA256SUMS.sigstore.jsonl \
    --repo andrewdryga/emisar \
    --signer-workflow AndrewDryga/emisar/.github/workflows/runner-release-trusted.yml \
    --source-ref refs/tags/runner-v<version> --deny-self-hosted-runners
✓ Verification succeeded!
…

# verify only the archive you downloaded
$ awk -v file='emisar-<version>-linux-amd64.tar.gz' \
    '$2 == file { print; found=1 } END { exit !found }' SHA256SUMS | sha256sum -c -
emisar-<version>-linux-amd64.tar.gz: OK

# optional online evidence for the archive and container (requires GitHub authentication)
$ gh attestation verify emisar-<version>-linux-amd64.tar.gz \
    --repo andrewdryga/emisar \
    --signer-workflow AndrewDryga/emisar/.github/workflows/runner-release-trusted.yml \
    --source-ref refs/tags/runner-v<version> --deny-self-hosted-runners
$ gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/andrewdryga/emisar-runner:<version> \
    --repo andrewdryga/emisar \
    --signer-workflow AndrewDryga/emisar/.github/workflows/runner-release-trusted.yml \
    --source-ref refs/tags/runner-v<version> --deny-self-hosted-runners

The signed checksum check is the installer's trust path when GitHub CLI is installed. It needs access to the two public trust-root hosts in Network requirements, but no GitHub login. Without GitHub CLI, the installers and emisar update ask before continuing, or warn and continue when run unattended. In that case the checksum from the release mirror alone proves the selected archive's bytes. An authenticated GitHub CLI can add the per-archive online check.

Reporting a vulnerability

Email security@emisar.dev. We acknowledge reports within 72 hours, keep you updated, and credit you if you'd like. Please give us a reasonable window to fix an issue before disclosing it publicly.